Yahya Sinwar has reshaped the Middle East, and his legacy will echo for decades. Who was he? Why did he initiate the 7 October attacks in the manner that he did? How will he be judged?
In this piece, I raised the possibility (not the certainty) that the long-term effect of Israel's war in Gaza would be to isolate it. It appears Biden's ambassador to Israel is worried about exactly the same dynamic:
“. . . what I’ve told people here that they have to worry about when this war is over is that the generational memory doesn’t go back to the founding of the state or the Six Day War, or the Yom Kippur War, or to the intifada even. It starts with this war, and you can’t ignore the impact of this war on future policymakers — not the people making the decisions today, but the people who are 25, 35, 45 today and who will be the leaders for the next 30 years, 40 years.”
You’re right and nothing is worked out and you can’t be cynical about the amount of human suffering in Gaza. But the perpetrators isn’t Hamas. It is odd how the violence of the oppressed are scrutinized, while the unimaginable violence of the oppressors are somehow tolerated. As Miko Peled points out. The Palestinians will be killed whether they take up arms or sleep in their beds.
Did you miss where Tom criticized western nations quite throughly ? Yes, there is a change in the world due to Palestine, but we have to be able to criticize the movement as well so we can help those most affected. We all want this desperately to stop . This was a very thorough and well thought out piece, and tho I don’t know you, Soeren, I think a bit more respect is needed to your replies of a piece so hardly researched and thought out (not to mention written by someone who has put his life, quite literally, on the line to help others). Dems in this country are making a similar mistake in being too afraid to criticize how we lost a winnable election. We cannot be afraid to speak about what is, and is not, working. We owe it to every precious life that is being lost there.
I respect you and Tom Dale, although I am not in a position to judge anyone, I have no doubt that you are on the right side of history. I simply think that if we are to get out of the misery of war and violence that we have ended up in, then empathy and the ability to be able to shift perspectives is absolutely crucial and perhaps the first skill we should mobilize. It is difficult to condemn Hamas without indirectly supporting the talking points which are at the center of Netanyahus attempt to legitimize a genocide. Even in deep recognition of the consequences of freedom struggle and violence/terror, Franz Fanon as an example understood that it is difficult to demand from a people who are being systematically and long-term dehumanized by their oppressors, that these people should fight nicely, well mannered, democratically and in accordance with deep humanist values. You can empathize without sympathizing. But crime begets crime and futile peaceful struggle for justice leads to powerlessness and desperate measures. How would we react ourselves if exposed to what the Palestinians have been exposed to? Sometimes the best of analysis can complicate matters of simple morality. Not to say that just causes necessarily ends up with just or appropriate
results. Knowing that could make us think that doing nothing could help us against wrongdoings but that’s an even bigger crime. I for my part try to imagine how it must have been to be Yahya Sinwar experiencing that the institutions that should safeguard human rights and international justice were impotent faced with Israeli impunity and oppression of the Palestinians. And how it is living an unbearable status quo. What if it gives more meaning to fetch an Al-Yassin 105 against a Merkava tank, with death as the most likely outcome, than to live a life without perspective and in eternal humiliation? And yes it involves children and innocents who never had a choice to decide if they were prepared to die or be maimed for life. There ought to be a better way, but before we have the real powers to materialize it, and prevent the unrestrained violence of our masters, this Way is nothing but a pious wish.
That’s very kind- and I hope i am not taking up too much of the comments here. I don’t condemn anyone and I didn’t take that from Tom’s piece at all, it was to me an analysis of Sinwar’s history. I cannot speak for anyone else, but I don’t hate or judge any Palestinian for doing what they can to survive. I would strongly suggest if you haven’t yet to read Tom’s first piece, about his time in Palestine, which is very moving and excellent , one of the best pieces I’ve read. It really taught me a great deal as I am someone involved in community in the US for Palestine.
yeah i think you are right. many international factors were involved in the magnificent fall of Assad but none of them grew because of Hamas strategy ...one was the fact that the Ukrainian resistance held on for three years and Putin could not play his past role in propping up Assad. But if anything the Hamas strategy has empowered Netanyahu's forever and wherever killing machine...off the top...
Excellent piece. “The case against Sinwar must be not that he was cruel, but that he lacked political judgement, and that in consequence he brought upon his people a deluge of destruction and torment without advancing their struggle.” What do you think of Norman Finkelsteins argument re Nat Turner, and the long calculation he made re the slave revolt putting their plight on the map?
Thanks Nizami. I've just looked up Norman's piece here: https://www.normanfinkelstein.com/nat-turner-in-gaza/ - I'm not sure he argues there that Turner made a long calculation. And although he says that Turner became a "legendary black hero", it's not clear to me that he's claiming an actual causal connection between the revolt and the ultimate abolition of slavery. I think the "Owl of Minerva" point with which he closes the essay is more about interpretation than causality. I.e. what meaning do we attribute to the revolt?
I do agree that it's possible that Al-Aqsa Flood will one day be reevaluated, but would stress that the risks are very high, especially because Zionism is a) a territorial project and b) does not rely structurally on the labour of the oppressed. In that sense it is more analogous to the white seizure of land from the native Americans/First Nations than slave-holding in the American South. That is, the slavers couldn't achieve a permanent victory by ethnic cleansing in the way the pioneers did over the First Nations.
If you read Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (everyone should, it's brilliant), you'll find a few examples of massacres against white pioneers similar to those carried out by Turner's small force. So how do we interpret those?
It's clear that the balance of sympathy is strongly with the First Nations, and against the pioneers. From memory (dont quote me on this, it's a while since I read it), it's rare that they can be described as strategic errors, because it was so clear that the pioneers were going to do more or less what they did anyway.
I don't believe the Palestinian cause is so hopeless though, which raises the strategic stakes of leadership decisions.
Spent a while just now trying to find the interview (there are many.) Finkelstein has certainly explored the idea that Turner wanted to smash the status quo and put the plight of black slaves on the map. See the Robinson session (https://youtu.be/2pPWMP4y4Ds?si=Dpa5c0rojwbDZ9wv). Nutshell? The revolt came to the attention of the abolitionists, whose refusal to condemn the revolt Finkelstein found inspiring—in the context he has repeatedly and passionately set out, that the Flood guys were all young men with serious grievances against their oppressor, and the fact that they had nothing to lose. "They were born in, and would likely die in, a concentration camp." F admitted that even he had given up on the Palestinian cause, particularly post Abraham Accords.
And then there was Oct 7, and the "response." Everyone knew it would be awful. Few knew how awful. Opposing that awfulness has become /the/ global axis of protest/resistance, with Palestine as living emblem. Did Nasrallah, Sinwar et al foresee this? We shall never know.
None of this is to say that the Flood was a calmly executed exercise, purely for strategic reasons. It is difficult/impossible to judge those who committed atrocities during Flood. Finkelstein reminds us of the dire, hopeless projection of their status quo—live a miserable life and die a miserable death in a concentration camp. This is echoed today by reports of young Palestinian children ideating suicide.
However, you are also right to query rationalisations of such extremes. If I try to imagine myself Palestinian (a flawed premise, sure) with, say, parents battered or murdered in front of my eyes, grandma's olive grove trashed (again), my home destroyed (again) and my kid brother's arm broken with a rock, I think I'd be pretty angry. There would be a risk of me losing my shit. This thought experiment is not to "justify" atrocities but to understand them. This is the line Gabor Mate takes. Someone does something extreme, we must ask why? What has happened to them to make them do that?
Interpolating, you may be making the point Aaron Mate makes to Norman in this clip (https://youtu.be/sY2rFVtYDjU?si=YrU7lqClBuQmVFGT)...that "Hamas had more agency than the slaves." Norman's response comes from his trademark passionate humanism.
Hi, unfortunately I’m not going to be able to watch the discussion video now, but three brief points:
I would agree that the Palestinians corporately and individually have more agency than slaves in the U.S. South.
More importantly, at least for the purposes of my essay, Sinwar was not just any Palestinian. Sure, he’d had a tough life in many ways. But he was a statesman, the leader of a movement. That entails a special responsibility: to think strategically, to take into account consequences, etc. Is it understandable that a young man in the position you describe would do something violent to a civilian in response to their oppression, by way of a visceral reaction? Sure. But that isn’t the main issue here. Politics isn’t just a matter of playing out the most naive reaction to every set of experiences, independent of reflection on historical and contemporary reality. And as I emphasise, Sinwar had plenty of opportunity to study the Palestinian national movement’s history and to reflect upon it.
Even on the level of the young men who stormed into Israel on 7/10 there was agency. Example: the Guardian reported the testimony of a woman IDF soldier (Lt Tamar Bar Shimon) to the effect that a Hamas guy was taking her clothes off and another Hamas guy saved her and let her go. In some locations, young children or the very elderly were taken hostage, in others they weren’t. Etc. Etc.
Ok off the topic and open to being corrected..I agree with your point about agency ... and accountability for outcome when one takes a leadership role ..yeah from the point of view of strategy and goal, lets assume the goal of actual liberation of the people, it is true that the situation with all the projects under discussion is asymmetrical and for that reason may well depend on support from forces including but also outside the specific area with enough common experience status and goals to make solidarity action feasible. Would the outcome in this situation been potentially better or worse if they only targetted military targets and active settlers? I think it is an important difference. Sirwar's statements about him being ready to sacrifice even more Palestinian lives than already happened to reach his goal can hardly be considered prioritizing the liberation of masses of people but rather seems like a route to power but not really popular liberation. In the most admired example in the West of the Algerian Revolution, its made really clear that the goal of moving from just military targets to French people..seen as occupiers..... and the resultant massacre in the Casbah, etc. the perspective was definitely to create massive instability, discomfort if not sympathy for the masses of slaughtered Algerians, eventually making a deal with imperialists in which they would take power. Arguably the removal of French colonial power could have set the stage for a second rising of the people demanding democracy and material advances, but authoritarianism and oppression under a different rule was the more likely outcome at that time...
Right. And alot of the people who like to elevate Frantz Fanon as the "apostle of violence" don't like to grapple with the fact that he also - in The Wretched of the Earth - accurately predicted that indigenous post-colonial dictatorships would go on to take over many of the attributes of colonial rule.
This is another fantastic piece- and it lead me to learn more, as i am embarrassed to say I had to look up some of the things you mentioned (thank you for providing such a thorough list of what you used to write this at the end). I think we need to look at where the Palestinian resistance is failing, even though some in the movement find it wrong to question, which is a mistake to me. If we can save even one child , one life, it is beyond worth it. I think your writing was extremely fair, and critical of all parties to this, including my own governments, once again. And how you used Sinwar’s quote of the issue of those who are “outside,” coming in and trying to “fix” things, and that most who have seen war don’t want it . I think as I am not quite as smart as you are I will have to re read this yet again- it has really engaged me and expanded my knowledge (I had no idea sinwar admitted mistakes, or that my terrible embarrassing govt of course made things worse in the past). I also appreciate that you highlighted Palestinians own discontent with Hamas. And should we not listen to them first and foremost? This analysis was so good- brava. My only I guess, criticism, would be I would really enjoy more of your own experience coming through, as you did in your first piece, but that’s mainly a personal preference. Fantastic work, and thank you for the time you put into it . Proud to be a subscriber.
I think many would find your assessment of the "Great March of Return" very odd. If the border had been breached en masse, surely something similar to October 7th would then have taken place? No Israeli civilians were in harm's way precisely because the marchers were prevented from breaching the border.
Of course you know that the marchers were overwhelmingly unarmed, unlike the squads on 7/10. So perhaps you believe that any unarmed breach of the fence would have been exploited by armed men? So, quickly, we get to the core logic of Israel's position: every Palestinian civilian is terrorist in waiting, or potential cover for a terrorist, and so whenever Palestinians embark on any form of resistance, no matter how non-violent, Israel has the right to preemptively use military force against them. Well, there you have the logic that has led to genocide.
Would you say that Palestinians get to preemptively kill unarmed Jewish civilians who might become a threat later, or does this privilege only go one way?
One could say that Israel should have had recourse merely to civilian methods of crowd control, of the sort that it would use against its own Jewish citizens. And that would be a big improvement on what actually happened. But the more fundamental point is that Israel should have ended the siege of Gaza, and the rest of the occupation with it, let the Palestinians have an independent state on the territory occupied in 1967, and let them live. At that point the border will acquire a different political significance.
"Of course you know that the marchers were overwhelmingly unarmed, unlike the squads on 7/10." I do not know this. Hamas claimed 50 of the dead on 14 May 2018 as its militants, and groups of people attempted to violently breach the fence. It doesn't take much imagination to understand what would have happened if they had succeeded. The idea that ordinary methods of civil crowd control would work in such a situation is probably naive, although I am quite ready to believe that the Israeli army used disproportionate violence.
I agree that a two-state solution would be much better than this mess. But in the immediate, allowing a vast crowd to break through the border would obviously have been a terrible decision, and it would be foolish to expect the Israeli government to allow this to happen.
Hamas might have said that 50 of its *members* were killed, but there is no legitimate presumption that they were militants. The movement's membership is mostly civilian.
It might be naive to believe that Israel would do anything different, but that is only because it is a violent, racist, occupying power that considers Palestinians as little better than animals. Once again, the appropriate conclusion is to end the occupation.
Very interesting in spite of the “tough to hide admiration” for this psychopath. He was exactly as the image of Palestinian elites, hence totally irresponsible, manipulative and unable to build anything else that is completely “self-destructive”.
It's not admiration as such. The reason for the title is that I'd see him like an Oedipus, Hamlet, or Macbeth: one who by a combination of bad luck (fate) and personal flaws brought ruin to themselves and the polity they lead. But whose great striving for a goal that is either legitimate or understandable nonetheless expresses great human qualities that cause us to empathise with the author of the doomed attempt.
Tragedies are ultimately warnings: we're supposed learn from the tragic hero's flaws and disdain for contingency - for the gods in the classical conception. But they're the greatest form of drama only because they refuse the Marvel Comics Universe model of character in which people are absolutely admirable or absolutely to be disdained. If Sinwar was merely a thug, the story would be boring. But it isn't, because he wasn't.
Thank you for your comment. I enjoy your capacity for mixing historical references and your understanding of mythological metaphors, something that is terribly missing nowadays and hence I commend you for that because I did enjoy your piece.
I am nonetheless always triggered by the idea a genuinely bad guy (with nothing constructive under his belt) could initiate such empathy. It is just my opinion on the matter and do not take it as me admonishing you for it. I respect your opinions.
My two cents though on this guy is what I said earlier. He is the archetype of Palestinian leadership (across the board, from PLO to Hamas) that is, unable to build anything else that is for destructive purposes. I think there is a great myth to write about that. These leaders put efforts only in what is destructive and nothing into what is constructive, whether it be for the Palestinian people or for the peace with Israel. The moral of this myth is that because they put only effort into destructive measures, then will end up destroying the Palestinian cause ultimately.
Thank you. If we say for the sake of argument that Palestinian leadership has mostly been bad - it often looks from a distance like a series of unforced errors - that raises the question as to why. Some people will want to say that Palestinians are genetically inferior or culturally predisposed to violence, or something. I don't agree with those explanations.
It's too big a topic to go into much detail here, but the explanation given by both historians (e.g. Sayigh) and political scientists (e.g. Pearlman), is that it is a function of two basic problems: 1) division; and 2) the overwhelming strength of Israel and its real lack of interest in meaningful concessions.
The Nakba produced geographic division, and hence a series of different Palestinian experiences, which in turn gave rise to different political currents. Because a divided national movement can achieve nothing, Palestinian leaders feel compelled to prioritise defending and improving their political support in an effort to unify the nation behind them. But they don't have any tools to make the lives of their people better, because the occupation and geographical division stops such steps.
So they have to compete via demonstrably resisting the occupation, which in turn means attacks on Israel, and by adopting maximalist positions. As a result, violence against Israel has often been driven by the needs of short term domestic political competition, rather than by what it makes sense to do strategically from the national point of view. Leaders often consolidate the domestic political position at the expense of the national interest. So e.g. Hamas starts doing suicide bombings, Fatah loses support, and hence starts doing suicide bombings to build support, which works, but at the expense of its own national strategy, which rightly assumed that suicide bombings would be counterproductive.
Another example. Fateh realised the need for a two state solution in the late '60s. But because the PFLP etc were always willing to compete with Fateh from the outside by e.g. hijacking planes and raising maximalist slogans (and were funded by various external states in their own interests), Fateh was unable to deliver a strategically unified PLO in the diaspora until 1988, and by then Hamas had come into being in Gaza, and so the problem started again.
Everyone involved is responsible for what they do. However, the only way to cut the dynamic is achieve unity and commit to e.g. no attacks on civilians/outside the Green Line, and a two state solution. There is one major Palestinian leader who offers that line, has for more than two decades, and is more popular than any other: Marwan Barghouti. Not coincidentally, he is also the Palestinian prisoner Israel is most adamant that they won't release, precisely because they know this position is a strategic threat to their objectives, i.e. keeping Palestinians divided, and continuing to colonise the territories occupied in 1967.
Having tried to discuss this on here a few times, I'm used to people not accepting that this is a real and important dynamic, even though the historians and political scientists who've examined the question stress it. I think it's hard to see without going through events in a granular way. I will try and write something more detailed about it at some point.
"Some people will want to say that Palestinians are genetically inferior or culturally predisposed to violence, or something",
you are actually reducing or belittling my arguments that is, the Palestinian leadership has never built anything other than destructive projects that ultimately destroy the Palestinian cause and hurts its people. Never did I imply that Palestinian people are genetically inferior or inclined to violence.
My argument strictly concerns the leadership, where there is almost empirical evidence to sustain it. Absolutely no industry was created by either the PA or Hamas other than the rockets, the tunnels and the various internationally-sponsored organisations aimed at controlling the population and teaching hate to almost industrial levels. UNRWA being the most recognisable one! Don't get me started about most of the top leadership being billionaires (from that international money)
Now you had me until you brought up Marwan Barghouti! He is no different than Hamas except for the Pied Piper like deceiving demeanour! He is just like Sinwar except he can talk to westerners and completely duped them to believe he is not a terrorist in his core! The man has orchestrated suicide bombings in buses, restaurants and coffee terraces , yet there must be a conspiracy that he is a man of peace?
Last but not least, regarding the two reasons you gave. 1. One cannot understand the Middle East unless you do it through the "clannish" or even "sectarian" prism. This is the base of any understanding, however absolutely no scholar on the subject ever bring it up as the base of their studies. That clannish base explains the idea of division you brought up. Palestinians are not divided because of geographic divisions but because of their clannish culture. Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza are highly divided because of their clannish societal structure. Just like Lebanon, Syria, Irak, Jordan, ... It is completely amateurish from westerners - and even worse from middle eastern - experts to present us the situation under the prisms of countries or political organizations. Under these "brands" lie a bunch of clans. Now, I'm not saying either that clannish structures are inferior to western democracies. All I can say is that clannish ruling countries have to find their mojos. UAE being the closest one to succeed although the Abu Dhabi Emirate took a strong control on the country. Saudi Arabia is a one-clan show just as Jordan is. 2. Saying that Israel was not generous enough is ridiculous. Barak offered 97% of the West Bank and 100% of Gaza. Even some territorial transfer was on the table (transferring Israeli territory in exchange for some of the West Bank; in other words a shift in the West Bank border). Now every time Israel made territorial concessions, Palestinians offered suicide bombers in 1994 and rockets in 2005. I’ll throw in there a full-on intifada after camp David in 2000. Other tremendous constructively-destructive ideas from the leadership.
Although I hope to be peace one day and that Palestinians can enjoy leaving a free and peaceful life alongside Israelis; I do believe that as of today their cause is a scary death cult and it is so mind boggling to see the interest and sympathy some westerners may have for it; totally hindering their capacity for change!
I'm happy to acknowledge that you didn't reach for genetic etc. explanations. My point was just that one needs an explanation, whatever it is.
We don't agree on many of the background facts. That includes Barak's "offer" (not actually an offer), on which this is worth a read: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/08/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/. UNRWA doesn't teach hate. Palestinians don't really have a "clannish" culture, and political divisions observably don't fall along the lines of extended families. In Gaza especially large extended families usually have members in several political factions. The divisions are political. But anyway, it's not possible to grasp the process without getting into the history in detail.
Re Barghouti: a) I don't know what he did or did do, but the case made against him was poor, the trial was a total farce, and there was essentially no evidence apart from alleged statements made under torture - cf. this report, which goes through it: http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/174/report.htm; b) even if he did do the things he was accused of, that doesn't explain why he wasn't let out, because Israel has been willing to let out people who've been convicted of worse, and with more uncompromising views; c) it's not just Westerners who want him out - he's got a former head of Shin Bet and a former head of the Mossad saying the same thing. I think their assessment that he could deliver a compromise is accurate.
We definitely are on polar spectrum regarding all arguments and facts (Barak, UNRWA, and Barghouti). It’s almost alternate realities at this point. I do stand by the clannish prism argument I made in spite of having different clan members in different organizations or political parties; just like other middle eastern countries. Your book on Camp David and Barak sounds terribly partisan. Israel is way more of a democracy with an independent judicial system than you may want to make it sound like. Barghouti is in jail for several life sentences due to countless civilian murders, is the official reason. I find the idea that you have no idea what “he did or did do” very suspicious! Your former shin bet or mossad heads in favor of liberating Barghouti argument, if that’s true, sounds like some guys are looking to a political career. Qatar knows how to support their partners very well.
Anyway the more I read you the more it seems to me that objectivity is not on your agenda and if I’m wrong, I suggest, if I may, that you read materials outside of the pro-Palestinian realm. Your alignment on their rhetoric is flawed.
i’m not sure how you can attribute the current genocide, even in part, to sinwar’s “tremendous failures” or supposed “cruelty.” you say yourself, peaceful mass movement had achieved nothing, and it was always the end goal of the zionists to totally erase the palestinian people and seize the land completely, long before october 7th. the stranglehold of the occupation was unbreakable from the inside as long as israel had the financial and military support of the world’s most powerful empire. if palestinian resistance became a serious threat to israeli control, no matter if 0 civilians died, we would have seen this same response.
I'm sure Netanyahu would have wanted to do the same thing. However I don't believe he would have got the same latitude from the U.S. That's a counterfactual, and no one can know for sure - but that's my opinion.
My understanding is that this text was not really written by Sinwar. Someone wrote it after his death as a creative/fictional piece, but then it was circulated as real by others.
Thanks Konstantin. I'm open to evidence of Tehran's involvement in various ways, but I feel Kyle vastly overstates the aggregate picture. He makes Hamas appear as merely a catspaw of Iran - almost the inverse of the traditional 1970s anti-imperialist way of seeing Israel, as merely an extension of the U.S. Obviously Iran helped Hamas: they helped with design and manufacturing processes for military technology (although everything beyond rifles and rifle ammo is manufactured in Gaza), and with training, and to an extent with money. But 7/10 was mostly carried out with conventional small arms and commercial drones, which Iran's help wasn't needed for. Since Israel went in to the strip, the Yassin 105s and shaped charges that Iran helped with have been more impactful - but still not very impactful, and Gazans would have been able to figure them out themselves eventually. The rockets have always been utterly useless, tactically and strategically. And the training . . . wasn't great. Unlike Hezbollah infantry, who can go toe to toe with IDF soldiers when the latter don't have air support, Al-Qassam's fighters lack foundational tactical combat skills. Most of Hamas's money came from taxing Gazans by a long, long way.
Kyle overstates the extent of smuggling, and also the importance of the whole "last promise" thing, which I have found no record of being used by any Hamas leader, anywhere, in any circumstance.
Most importantly, Hamas launched the operation for their own reasons, not because Iran told them to. And I doubt that Iran anticipated the scale and character of the attack - no one did. Even Hamas didn't expect what turned out to be a 'catastrophic success'. Much as the U.S. cannot force Ukraine to fight, but can only make its fight more difficult by withholding support, Iran can cannot force Hamas to fight, only withhold support. I think the CIA analysis of the relationship that he criticises in his linked Jan 2024 article is basically correct.
I may have engaged in some hyperbole on the subject of revenge, but I've basically never seen any reporting that characterized Hamas or Fatah as having disciplined cadres committed to following orders and the laws of war.
But my use of military here puts the thing in the wrong light. The real standard to meet, would be if the Palestinians could be as successful as the Irish Republican Army in terms of picking military and police targets. This is not to say that the IRA always limited itself to military and government targets in actual fact, but attacks on British soldiers and skillful propaganda helped to prevent the IRA from being dismissed as nihilists bent on wanton destruction.
I would strongly agree that Palestinians should only pick military targets. A more obviously relevant example than the IRA would be Hezbollah during Israel's occupation of South Lebanon. From 1992 they killed about 11 Israeli civilians and about 270 Israel soldiers, and crucially they won, forcing Israel out. The IRA was much less discriminate than that. One of several remarkable thing about that war is that the IRA killed several times more British troops than vice versa. That's the only counterinsurgency in history where the ratio doesn't go the other way.
If you're interested in why the Palestinian armed struggle has often been such a mess, two key texts are Armed Struggle and the Search for State (Sayigh) and Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (Pearlman). In brief, it's not so much that Palestinian leaders are individually bad, but the fracturing of the nation produced by the Nakba set off a series of dynamics that made discipline hard to impose, and made spectacular violence a tool of internal Palestinian political competition. They're academic works, but very good, especially the first.
I reject any criticism of Palestinian militants actions that does not take into account the daily horror of life under Israeli occupation, and how this turns human beings into monsters.
That said, what is unforgivable about Sinwar's actions, and those of generations of Palestinian leaders, is the utter lack of military professionalism or any attempt to view military action as something other than a glorious, divine sanctioned opportunity for revenge, rape, and pillage. This account has Sinwar surprised by this. I don't know if that's true, but it's unconscionable for a leader not to recognize how his troops behave.
You can have the iron will and political sagacity of a Lenin or a Ben Gurion but it means nothing if you can't direct the violence you unleash in a way that serves your cause. Sinwar does not seem to have made a serious attempt to do this.
I don't think Palestinian leadership have ever viewed military action as "a glorious, divine sanctioned opportunity for revenge, rape and pillage." That is going way too far. I would agree that Sinwar and the senior leadership had a responsibility to inculcate an ethos among their troops that was evidently lacking at times on 7 October, and that previous Palestinian military leaderships have similarly failed to instil discipline and respect for military ethics.
I do think in the circumstances it would have been difficult. Professional militaries inculcate these values over decades, have a tested NCO layer and experience fighting around civilians associated with an enemy force etc. And it still often goes wrong. And we're talking here about an ethnic war, which have a strong tendency to produce atrocities at the best of times.
So yes, the leadership had a duty to prepare the troops - and perhaps they tried and failed to do so sufficiently. The conduct wasn't universally atrocious and in at leasy some cases norms were respected to some degree.
I think there always would have been a risk of some abuses on contact with civilians. This is why I stress on the strategic level not going into majority-civilian areas, amd especially not trying to take hostages there. There were military targets in the kibbutzes, but in reality the fighters ended up enmeshed with non-combatant civilians.
In this piece, I raised the possibility (not the certainty) that the long-term effect of Israel's war in Gaza would be to isolate it. It appears Biden's ambassador to Israel is worried about exactly the same dynamic:
“. . . what I’ve told people here that they have to worry about when this war is over is that the generational memory doesn’t go back to the founding of the state or the Six Day War, or the Yom Kippur War, or to the intifada even. It starts with this war, and you can’t ignore the impact of this war on future policymakers — not the people making the decisions today, but the people who are 25, 35, 45 today and who will be the leaders for the next 30 years, 40 years.”
https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-ambassadors-farewell-warning-you-cant-ignore-the-impact-of-this-war-on-future-us-policymakers/
You are missing the bigger picture. Palestinians and Yahya Sinwar has given rise to a global anti imperialist movement.
If that movement achieves anything then we can ask whether it is important in "the bigger picture." But right now it hasn't.
First condition for any meaningful change is ideological emancipation from the western narrative. It has already begun
I'm sure the amputees living in tents for their second winter will be delighted to know you've got it all worked out.
You’re right and nothing is worked out and you can’t be cynical about the amount of human suffering in Gaza. But the perpetrators isn’t Hamas. It is odd how the violence of the oppressed are scrutinized, while the unimaginable violence of the oppressors are somehow tolerated. As Miko Peled points out. The Palestinians will be killed whether they take up arms or sleep in their beds.
"as Miko Peled points out" is not an argument.
No its the reality, are now and has been. Also called a finding!
Did you miss where Tom criticized western nations quite throughly ? Yes, there is a change in the world due to Palestine, but we have to be able to criticize the movement as well so we can help those most affected. We all want this desperately to stop . This was a very thorough and well thought out piece, and tho I don’t know you, Soeren, I think a bit more respect is needed to your replies of a piece so hardly researched and thought out (not to mention written by someone who has put his life, quite literally, on the line to help others). Dems in this country are making a similar mistake in being too afraid to criticize how we lost a winnable election. We cannot be afraid to speak about what is, and is not, working. We owe it to every precious life that is being lost there.
It's really ok! I don't mind having a discussion what I write
I respect you and Tom Dale, although I am not in a position to judge anyone, I have no doubt that you are on the right side of history. I simply think that if we are to get out of the misery of war and violence that we have ended up in, then empathy and the ability to be able to shift perspectives is absolutely crucial and perhaps the first skill we should mobilize. It is difficult to condemn Hamas without indirectly supporting the talking points which are at the center of Netanyahus attempt to legitimize a genocide. Even in deep recognition of the consequences of freedom struggle and violence/terror, Franz Fanon as an example understood that it is difficult to demand from a people who are being systematically and long-term dehumanized by their oppressors, that these people should fight nicely, well mannered, democratically and in accordance with deep humanist values. You can empathize without sympathizing. But crime begets crime and futile peaceful struggle for justice leads to powerlessness and desperate measures. How would we react ourselves if exposed to what the Palestinians have been exposed to? Sometimes the best of analysis can complicate matters of simple morality. Not to say that just causes necessarily ends up with just or appropriate
results. Knowing that could make us think that doing nothing could help us against wrongdoings but that’s an even bigger crime. I for my part try to imagine how it must have been to be Yahya Sinwar experiencing that the institutions that should safeguard human rights and international justice were impotent faced with Israeli impunity and oppression of the Palestinians. And how it is living an unbearable status quo. What if it gives more meaning to fetch an Al-Yassin 105 against a Merkava tank, with death as the most likely outcome, than to live a life without perspective and in eternal humiliation? And yes it involves children and innocents who never had a choice to decide if they were prepared to die or be maimed for life. There ought to be a better way, but before we have the real powers to materialize it, and prevent the unrestrained violence of our masters, this Way is nothing but a pious wish.
That’s very kind- and I hope i am not taking up too much of the comments here. I don’t condemn anyone and I didn’t take that from Tom’s piece at all, it was to me an analysis of Sinwar’s history. I cannot speak for anyone else, but I don’t hate or judge any Palestinian for doing what they can to survive. I would strongly suggest if you haven’t yet to read Tom’s first piece, about his time in Palestine, which is very moving and excellent , one of the best pieces I’ve read. It really taught me a great deal as I am someone involved in community in the US for Palestine.
yeah i think you are right. many international factors were involved in the magnificent fall of Assad but none of them grew because of Hamas strategy ...one was the fact that the Ukrainian resistance held on for three years and Putin could not play his past role in propping up Assad. But if anything the Hamas strategy has empowered Netanyahu's forever and wherever killing machine...off the top...
Excellent piece. “The case against Sinwar must be not that he was cruel, but that he lacked political judgement, and that in consequence he brought upon his people a deluge of destruction and torment without advancing their struggle.” What do you think of Norman Finkelsteins argument re Nat Turner, and the long calculation he made re the slave revolt putting their plight on the map?
Thanks Nizami. I've just looked up Norman's piece here: https://www.normanfinkelstein.com/nat-turner-in-gaza/ - I'm not sure he argues there that Turner made a long calculation. And although he says that Turner became a "legendary black hero", it's not clear to me that he's claiming an actual causal connection between the revolt and the ultimate abolition of slavery. I think the "Owl of Minerva" point with which he closes the essay is more about interpretation than causality. I.e. what meaning do we attribute to the revolt?
I do agree that it's possible that Al-Aqsa Flood will one day be reevaluated, but would stress that the risks are very high, especially because Zionism is a) a territorial project and b) does not rely structurally on the labour of the oppressed. In that sense it is more analogous to the white seizure of land from the native Americans/First Nations than slave-holding in the American South. That is, the slavers couldn't achieve a permanent victory by ethnic cleansing in the way the pioneers did over the First Nations.
If you read Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (everyone should, it's brilliant), you'll find a few examples of massacres against white pioneers similar to those carried out by Turner's small force. So how do we interpret those?
It's clear that the balance of sympathy is strongly with the First Nations, and against the pioneers. From memory (dont quote me on this, it's a while since I read it), it's rare that they can be described as strategic errors, because it was so clear that the pioneers were going to do more or less what they did anyway.
I don't believe the Palestinian cause is so hopeless though, which raises the strategic stakes of leadership decisions.
Spent a while just now trying to find the interview (there are many.) Finkelstein has certainly explored the idea that Turner wanted to smash the status quo and put the plight of black slaves on the map. See the Robinson session (https://youtu.be/2pPWMP4y4Ds?si=Dpa5c0rojwbDZ9wv). Nutshell? The revolt came to the attention of the abolitionists, whose refusal to condemn the revolt Finkelstein found inspiring—in the context he has repeatedly and passionately set out, that the Flood guys were all young men with serious grievances against their oppressor, and the fact that they had nothing to lose. "They were born in, and would likely die in, a concentration camp." F admitted that even he had given up on the Palestinian cause, particularly post Abraham Accords.
And then there was Oct 7, and the "response." Everyone knew it would be awful. Few knew how awful. Opposing that awfulness has become /the/ global axis of protest/resistance, with Palestine as living emblem. Did Nasrallah, Sinwar et al foresee this? We shall never know.
None of this is to say that the Flood was a calmly executed exercise, purely for strategic reasons. It is difficult/impossible to judge those who committed atrocities during Flood. Finkelstein reminds us of the dire, hopeless projection of their status quo—live a miserable life and die a miserable death in a concentration camp. This is echoed today by reports of young Palestinian children ideating suicide.
However, you are also right to query rationalisations of such extremes. If I try to imagine myself Palestinian (a flawed premise, sure) with, say, parents battered or murdered in front of my eyes, grandma's olive grove trashed (again), my home destroyed (again) and my kid brother's arm broken with a rock, I think I'd be pretty angry. There would be a risk of me losing my shit. This thought experiment is not to "justify" atrocities but to understand them. This is the line Gabor Mate takes. Someone does something extreme, we must ask why? What has happened to them to make them do that?
Interpolating, you may be making the point Aaron Mate makes to Norman in this clip (https://youtu.be/sY2rFVtYDjU?si=YrU7lqClBuQmVFGT)...that "Hamas had more agency than the slaves." Norman's response comes from his trademark passionate humanism.
Hi, unfortunately I’m not going to be able to watch the discussion video now, but three brief points:
I would agree that the Palestinians corporately and individually have more agency than slaves in the U.S. South.
More importantly, at least for the purposes of my essay, Sinwar was not just any Palestinian. Sure, he’d had a tough life in many ways. But he was a statesman, the leader of a movement. That entails a special responsibility: to think strategically, to take into account consequences, etc. Is it understandable that a young man in the position you describe would do something violent to a civilian in response to their oppression, by way of a visceral reaction? Sure. But that isn’t the main issue here. Politics isn’t just a matter of playing out the most naive reaction to every set of experiences, independent of reflection on historical and contemporary reality. And as I emphasise, Sinwar had plenty of opportunity to study the Palestinian national movement’s history and to reflect upon it.
Even on the level of the young men who stormed into Israel on 7/10 there was agency. Example: the Guardian reported the testimony of a woman IDF soldier (Lt Tamar Bar Shimon) to the effect that a Hamas guy was taking her clothes off and another Hamas guy saved her and let her go. In some locations, young children or the very elderly were taken hostage, in others they weren’t. Etc. Etc.
Ok off the topic and open to being corrected..I agree with your point about agency ... and accountability for outcome when one takes a leadership role ..yeah from the point of view of strategy and goal, lets assume the goal of actual liberation of the people, it is true that the situation with all the projects under discussion is asymmetrical and for that reason may well depend on support from forces including but also outside the specific area with enough common experience status and goals to make solidarity action feasible. Would the outcome in this situation been potentially better or worse if they only targetted military targets and active settlers? I think it is an important difference. Sirwar's statements about him being ready to sacrifice even more Palestinian lives than already happened to reach his goal can hardly be considered prioritizing the liberation of masses of people but rather seems like a route to power but not really popular liberation. In the most admired example in the West of the Algerian Revolution, its made really clear that the goal of moving from just military targets to French people..seen as occupiers..... and the resultant massacre in the Casbah, etc. the perspective was definitely to create massive instability, discomfort if not sympathy for the masses of slaughtered Algerians, eventually making a deal with imperialists in which they would take power. Arguably the removal of French colonial power could have set the stage for a second rising of the people demanding democracy and material advances, but authoritarianism and oppression under a different rule was the more likely outcome at that time...
Right. And alot of the people who like to elevate Frantz Fanon as the "apostle of violence" don't like to grapple with the fact that he also - in The Wretched of the Earth - accurately predicted that indigenous post-colonial dictatorships would go on to take over many of the attributes of colonial rule.
Brilliant piece.
Thank you Muhammed, much appreciated. Please do subscribe. I'm a bit busy at the moment, but regular service will recommence in just over a month.
This is another fantastic piece- and it lead me to learn more, as i am embarrassed to say I had to look up some of the things you mentioned (thank you for providing such a thorough list of what you used to write this at the end). I think we need to look at where the Palestinian resistance is failing, even though some in the movement find it wrong to question, which is a mistake to me. If we can save even one child , one life, it is beyond worth it. I think your writing was extremely fair, and critical of all parties to this, including my own governments, once again. And how you used Sinwar’s quote of the issue of those who are “outside,” coming in and trying to “fix” things, and that most who have seen war don’t want it . I think as I am not quite as smart as you are I will have to re read this yet again- it has really engaged me and expanded my knowledge (I had no idea sinwar admitted mistakes, or that my terrible embarrassing govt of course made things worse in the past). I also appreciate that you highlighted Palestinians own discontent with Hamas. And should we not listen to them first and foremost? This analysis was so good- brava. My only I guess, criticism, would be I would really enjoy more of your own experience coming through, as you did in your first piece, but that’s mainly a personal preference. Fantastic work, and thank you for the time you put into it . Proud to be a subscriber.
Thanks Johanna!
Very interesting read, well researched and referenced
Thank you Sam, please do subscribe. Aim is to keep the quality consistently high.
I thought that was Freddie Mercury at first!!
Tragedy gives birth to the land of inspiration and is a gateway to Higher Ground ✌🏼🇱🇧🇮🇷🇾🇪🇸🇾🇮🇶❤️🙏🕉
I think many would find your assessment of the "Great March of Return" very odd. If the border had been breached en masse, surely something similar to October 7th would then have taken place? No Israeli civilians were in harm's way precisely because the marchers were prevented from breaching the border.
Of course you know that the marchers were overwhelmingly unarmed, unlike the squads on 7/10. So perhaps you believe that any unarmed breach of the fence would have been exploited by armed men? So, quickly, we get to the core logic of Israel's position: every Palestinian civilian is terrorist in waiting, or potential cover for a terrorist, and so whenever Palestinians embark on any form of resistance, no matter how non-violent, Israel has the right to preemptively use military force against them. Well, there you have the logic that has led to genocide.
Would you say that Palestinians get to preemptively kill unarmed Jewish civilians who might become a threat later, or does this privilege only go one way?
One could say that Israel should have had recourse merely to civilian methods of crowd control, of the sort that it would use against its own Jewish citizens. And that would be a big improvement on what actually happened. But the more fundamental point is that Israel should have ended the siege of Gaza, and the rest of the occupation with it, let the Palestinians have an independent state on the territory occupied in 1967, and let them live. At that point the border will acquire a different political significance.
"Of course you know that the marchers were overwhelmingly unarmed, unlike the squads on 7/10." I do not know this. Hamas claimed 50 of the dead on 14 May 2018 as its militants, and groups of people attempted to violently breach the fence. It doesn't take much imagination to understand what would have happened if they had succeeded. The idea that ordinary methods of civil crowd control would work in such a situation is probably naive, although I am quite ready to believe that the Israeli army used disproportionate violence.
I agree that a two-state solution would be much better than this mess. But in the immediate, allowing a vast crowd to break through the border would obviously have been a terrible decision, and it would be foolish to expect the Israeli government to allow this to happen.
Hamas might have said that 50 of its *members* were killed, but there is no legitimate presumption that they were militants. The movement's membership is mostly civilian.
It might be naive to believe that Israel would do anything different, but that is only because it is a violent, racist, occupying power that considers Palestinians as little better than animals. Once again, the appropriate conclusion is to end the occupation.
Very interesting in spite of the “tough to hide admiration” for this psychopath. He was exactly as the image of Palestinian elites, hence totally irresponsible, manipulative and unable to build anything else that is completely “self-destructive”.
It's not admiration as such. The reason for the title is that I'd see him like an Oedipus, Hamlet, or Macbeth: one who by a combination of bad luck (fate) and personal flaws brought ruin to themselves and the polity they lead. But whose great striving for a goal that is either legitimate or understandable nonetheless expresses great human qualities that cause us to empathise with the author of the doomed attempt.
Tragedies are ultimately warnings: we're supposed learn from the tragic hero's flaws and disdain for contingency - for the gods in the classical conception. But they're the greatest form of drama only because they refuse the Marvel Comics Universe model of character in which people are absolutely admirable or absolutely to be disdained. If Sinwar was merely a thug, the story would be boring. But it isn't, because he wasn't.
Thank you for your comment. I enjoy your capacity for mixing historical references and your understanding of mythological metaphors, something that is terribly missing nowadays and hence I commend you for that because I did enjoy your piece.
I am nonetheless always triggered by the idea a genuinely bad guy (with nothing constructive under his belt) could initiate such empathy. It is just my opinion on the matter and do not take it as me admonishing you for it. I respect your opinions.
My two cents though on this guy is what I said earlier. He is the archetype of Palestinian leadership (across the board, from PLO to Hamas) that is, unable to build anything else that is for destructive purposes. I think there is a great myth to write about that. These leaders put efforts only in what is destructive and nothing into what is constructive, whether it be for the Palestinian people or for the peace with Israel. The moral of this myth is that because they put only effort into destructive measures, then will end up destroying the Palestinian cause ultimately.
Thank you. If we say for the sake of argument that Palestinian leadership has mostly been bad - it often looks from a distance like a series of unforced errors - that raises the question as to why. Some people will want to say that Palestinians are genetically inferior or culturally predisposed to violence, or something. I don't agree with those explanations.
It's too big a topic to go into much detail here, but the explanation given by both historians (e.g. Sayigh) and political scientists (e.g. Pearlman), is that it is a function of two basic problems: 1) division; and 2) the overwhelming strength of Israel and its real lack of interest in meaningful concessions.
The Nakba produced geographic division, and hence a series of different Palestinian experiences, which in turn gave rise to different political currents. Because a divided national movement can achieve nothing, Palestinian leaders feel compelled to prioritise defending and improving their political support in an effort to unify the nation behind them. But they don't have any tools to make the lives of their people better, because the occupation and geographical division stops such steps.
So they have to compete via demonstrably resisting the occupation, which in turn means attacks on Israel, and by adopting maximalist positions. As a result, violence against Israel has often been driven by the needs of short term domestic political competition, rather than by what it makes sense to do strategically from the national point of view. Leaders often consolidate the domestic political position at the expense of the national interest. So e.g. Hamas starts doing suicide bombings, Fatah loses support, and hence starts doing suicide bombings to build support, which works, but at the expense of its own national strategy, which rightly assumed that suicide bombings would be counterproductive.
Another example. Fateh realised the need for a two state solution in the late '60s. But because the PFLP etc were always willing to compete with Fateh from the outside by e.g. hijacking planes and raising maximalist slogans (and were funded by various external states in their own interests), Fateh was unable to deliver a strategically unified PLO in the diaspora until 1988, and by then Hamas had come into being in Gaza, and so the problem started again.
Everyone involved is responsible for what they do. However, the only way to cut the dynamic is achieve unity and commit to e.g. no attacks on civilians/outside the Green Line, and a two state solution. There is one major Palestinian leader who offers that line, has for more than two decades, and is more popular than any other: Marwan Barghouti. Not coincidentally, he is also the Palestinian prisoner Israel is most adamant that they won't release, precisely because they know this position is a strategic threat to their objectives, i.e. keeping Palestinians divided, and continuing to colonise the territories occupied in 1967.
Having tried to discuss this on here a few times, I'm used to people not accepting that this is a real and important dynamic, even though the historians and political scientists who've examined the question stress it. I think it's hard to see without going through events in a granular way. I will try and write something more detailed about it at some point.
With this comment:
"Some people will want to say that Palestinians are genetically inferior or culturally predisposed to violence, or something",
you are actually reducing or belittling my arguments that is, the Palestinian leadership has never built anything other than destructive projects that ultimately destroy the Palestinian cause and hurts its people. Never did I imply that Palestinian people are genetically inferior or inclined to violence.
My argument strictly concerns the leadership, where there is almost empirical evidence to sustain it. Absolutely no industry was created by either the PA or Hamas other than the rockets, the tunnels and the various internationally-sponsored organisations aimed at controlling the population and teaching hate to almost industrial levels. UNRWA being the most recognisable one! Don't get me started about most of the top leadership being billionaires (from that international money)
Now you had me until you brought up Marwan Barghouti! He is no different than Hamas except for the Pied Piper like deceiving demeanour! He is just like Sinwar except he can talk to westerners and completely duped them to believe he is not a terrorist in his core! The man has orchestrated suicide bombings in buses, restaurants and coffee terraces , yet there must be a conspiracy that he is a man of peace?
Last but not least, regarding the two reasons you gave. 1. One cannot understand the Middle East unless you do it through the "clannish" or even "sectarian" prism. This is the base of any understanding, however absolutely no scholar on the subject ever bring it up as the base of their studies. That clannish base explains the idea of division you brought up. Palestinians are not divided because of geographic divisions but because of their clannish culture. Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza are highly divided because of their clannish societal structure. Just like Lebanon, Syria, Irak, Jordan, ... It is completely amateurish from westerners - and even worse from middle eastern - experts to present us the situation under the prisms of countries or political organizations. Under these "brands" lie a bunch of clans. Now, I'm not saying either that clannish structures are inferior to western democracies. All I can say is that clannish ruling countries have to find their mojos. UAE being the closest one to succeed although the Abu Dhabi Emirate took a strong control on the country. Saudi Arabia is a one-clan show just as Jordan is. 2. Saying that Israel was not generous enough is ridiculous. Barak offered 97% of the West Bank and 100% of Gaza. Even some territorial transfer was on the table (transferring Israeli territory in exchange for some of the West Bank; in other words a shift in the West Bank border). Now every time Israel made territorial concessions, Palestinians offered suicide bombers in 1994 and rockets in 2005. I’ll throw in there a full-on intifada after camp David in 2000. Other tremendous constructively-destructive ideas from the leadership.
Although I hope to be peace one day and that Palestinians can enjoy leaving a free and peaceful life alongside Israelis; I do believe that as of today their cause is a scary death cult and it is so mind boggling to see the interest and sympathy some westerners may have for it; totally hindering their capacity for change!
I'm happy to acknowledge that you didn't reach for genetic etc. explanations. My point was just that one needs an explanation, whatever it is.
We don't agree on many of the background facts. That includes Barak's "offer" (not actually an offer), on which this is worth a read: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/08/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/. UNRWA doesn't teach hate. Palestinians don't really have a "clannish" culture, and political divisions observably don't fall along the lines of extended families. In Gaza especially large extended families usually have members in several political factions. The divisions are political. But anyway, it's not possible to grasp the process without getting into the history in detail.
Re Barghouti: a) I don't know what he did or did do, but the case made against him was poor, the trial was a total farce, and there was essentially no evidence apart from alleged statements made under torture - cf. this report, which goes through it: http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/174/report.htm; b) even if he did do the things he was accused of, that doesn't explain why he wasn't let out, because Israel has been willing to let out people who've been convicted of worse, and with more uncompromising views; c) it's not just Westerners who want him out - he's got a former head of Shin Bet and a former head of the Mossad saying the same thing. I think their assessment that he could deliver a compromise is accurate.
We definitely are on polar spectrum regarding all arguments and facts (Barak, UNRWA, and Barghouti). It’s almost alternate realities at this point. I do stand by the clannish prism argument I made in spite of having different clan members in different organizations or political parties; just like other middle eastern countries. Your book on Camp David and Barak sounds terribly partisan. Israel is way more of a democracy with an independent judicial system than you may want to make it sound like. Barghouti is in jail for several life sentences due to countless civilian murders, is the official reason. I find the idea that you have no idea what “he did or did do” very suspicious! Your former shin bet or mossad heads in favor of liberating Barghouti argument, if that’s true, sounds like some guys are looking to a political career. Qatar knows how to support their partners very well.
Anyway the more I read you the more it seems to me that objectivity is not on your agenda and if I’m wrong, I suggest, if I may, that you read materials outside of the pro-Palestinian realm. Your alignment on their rhetoric is flawed.
i’m not sure how you can attribute the current genocide, even in part, to sinwar’s “tremendous failures” or supposed “cruelty.” you say yourself, peaceful mass movement had achieved nothing, and it was always the end goal of the zionists to totally erase the palestinian people and seize the land completely, long before october 7th. the stranglehold of the occupation was unbreakable from the inside as long as israel had the financial and military support of the world’s most powerful empire. if palestinian resistance became a serious threat to israeli control, no matter if 0 civilians died, we would have seen this same response.
I'm sure Netanyahu would have wanted to do the same thing. However I don't believe he would have got the same latitude from the U.S. That's a counterfactual, and no one can know for sure - but that's my opinion.
https://open.substack.com/pub/enamoured/p/the-testament-and-last-will-of-yahya?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=rmf8m
My understanding is that this text was not really written by Sinwar. Someone wrote it after his death as a creative/fictional piece, but then it was circulated as real by others.
Thank you.
Well let's assume: if Sinwar had to pen his will, could it be any different?
So to me the origins issue remains immaterial and non existent.
It's the legacy that matters.
Think it maybe a bit too early to write this article. But liberals will definitely love it.
Thanks for this insightful post I'm missing the part about his relationship with the IRGC, though. There's a structure behind this obviously he couldn't pull this of without powerful backers. See this piece f.e.: https://open.substack.com/pub/kyleorton/p/more-evidence-iran-role-oct-7-captured-hamas-documents?r=1rav9x&utm_medium=ios
Thanks Konstantin. I'm open to evidence of Tehran's involvement in various ways, but I feel Kyle vastly overstates the aggregate picture. He makes Hamas appear as merely a catspaw of Iran - almost the inverse of the traditional 1970s anti-imperialist way of seeing Israel, as merely an extension of the U.S. Obviously Iran helped Hamas: they helped with design and manufacturing processes for military technology (although everything beyond rifles and rifle ammo is manufactured in Gaza), and with training, and to an extent with money. But 7/10 was mostly carried out with conventional small arms and commercial drones, which Iran's help wasn't needed for. Since Israel went in to the strip, the Yassin 105s and shaped charges that Iran helped with have been more impactful - but still not very impactful, and Gazans would have been able to figure them out themselves eventually. The rockets have always been utterly useless, tactically and strategically. And the training . . . wasn't great. Unlike Hezbollah infantry, who can go toe to toe with IDF soldiers when the latter don't have air support, Al-Qassam's fighters lack foundational tactical combat skills. Most of Hamas's money came from taxing Gazans by a long, long way.
Kyle overstates the extent of smuggling, and also the importance of the whole "last promise" thing, which I have found no record of being used by any Hamas leader, anywhere, in any circumstance.
Most importantly, Hamas launched the operation for their own reasons, not because Iran told them to. And I doubt that Iran anticipated the scale and character of the attack - no one did. Even Hamas didn't expect what turned out to be a 'catastrophic success'. Much as the U.S. cannot force Ukraine to fight, but can only make its fight more difficult by withholding support, Iran can cannot force Hamas to fight, only withhold support. I think the CIA analysis of the relationship that he criticises in his linked Jan 2024 article is basically correct.
Thank you very much gor putting this in the right context! I appreciate this, keep up the great work!
I may have engaged in some hyperbole on the subject of revenge, but I've basically never seen any reporting that characterized Hamas or Fatah as having disciplined cadres committed to following orders and the laws of war.
But my use of military here puts the thing in the wrong light. The real standard to meet, would be if the Palestinians could be as successful as the Irish Republican Army in terms of picking military and police targets. This is not to say that the IRA always limited itself to military and government targets in actual fact, but attacks on British soldiers and skillful propaganda helped to prevent the IRA from being dismissed as nihilists bent on wanton destruction.
I would strongly agree that Palestinians should only pick military targets. A more obviously relevant example than the IRA would be Hezbollah during Israel's occupation of South Lebanon. From 1992 they killed about 11 Israeli civilians and about 270 Israel soldiers, and crucially they won, forcing Israel out. The IRA was much less discriminate than that. One of several remarkable thing about that war is that the IRA killed several times more British troops than vice versa. That's the only counterinsurgency in history where the ratio doesn't go the other way.
If you're interested in why the Palestinian armed struggle has often been such a mess, two key texts are Armed Struggle and the Search for State (Sayigh) and Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (Pearlman). In brief, it's not so much that Palestinian leaders are individually bad, but the fracturing of the nation produced by the Nakba set off a series of dynamics that made discipline hard to impose, and made spectacular violence a tool of internal Palestinian political competition. They're academic works, but very good, especially the first.
I reject any criticism of Palestinian militants actions that does not take into account the daily horror of life under Israeli occupation, and how this turns human beings into monsters.
That said, what is unforgivable about Sinwar's actions, and those of generations of Palestinian leaders, is the utter lack of military professionalism or any attempt to view military action as something other than a glorious, divine sanctioned opportunity for revenge, rape, and pillage. This account has Sinwar surprised by this. I don't know if that's true, but it's unconscionable for a leader not to recognize how his troops behave.
You can have the iron will and political sagacity of a Lenin or a Ben Gurion but it means nothing if you can't direct the violence you unleash in a way that serves your cause. Sinwar does not seem to have made a serious attempt to do this.
I don't think Palestinian leadership have ever viewed military action as "a glorious, divine sanctioned opportunity for revenge, rape and pillage." That is going way too far. I would agree that Sinwar and the senior leadership had a responsibility to inculcate an ethos among their troops that was evidently lacking at times on 7 October, and that previous Palestinian military leaderships have similarly failed to instil discipline and respect for military ethics.
I do think in the circumstances it would have been difficult. Professional militaries inculcate these values over decades, have a tested NCO layer and experience fighting around civilians associated with an enemy force etc. And it still often goes wrong. And we're talking here about an ethnic war, which have a strong tendency to produce atrocities at the best of times.
So yes, the leadership had a duty to prepare the troops - and perhaps they tried and failed to do so sufficiently. The conduct wasn't universally atrocious and in at leasy some cases norms were respected to some degree.
I think there always would have been a risk of some abuses on contact with civilians. This is why I stress on the strategic level not going into majority-civilian areas, amd especially not trying to take hostages there. There were military targets in the kibbutzes, but in reality the fighters ended up enmeshed with non-combatant civilians.