Sorry I’m shamefully behind on your writings. Thank you for including how difficult Biden made things, and opened the door for trump. Fantastic work as usual.
It's become a meme by now, but if you claim Israel's response is "overwhelming, disproportionate violence", it's only fair you offer an alternative? What would be a fitting response to a massacre so cruel where families are tortured on a Facebook livestream? When dead naked bodies of teenage girls are being lynched and spat on by civilians?
Happy to offer an alternative. Israel should have done a deal within a week for all the hostages and the end of the fighting.
Then, Israel should offer the Palestinians an actual state on the entirety of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in exchange for a total and permanent cessation of violence.
Don't tell me they wouldn't accept: if Israel hasn't offered it, that's just soeculation. Israel is the occupying power. They must get out. Every day the occupation continues is a day of Israeli war on Palestine.
Then take the troops that are now used to suppress and ethnically cleanse the West Bank, and use them to guard Israel's borders - if that policy had already been in operation on 7/10, fewer civilians would have died, perhaps none.
However cruel 7/10 was, it was orders of magnitude less cruel than what Israel has done in response, and than what Israel did in the Nakba. It was less cruel even than the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla, that Israel facilitated and oversaw. If 7/10 justified a response 50 or 100 times as violent, why do Israel's cruelties not themselves justify reprisals 50 or 100 times as violent again? How many Israelis do you think Hamas should be able to kill for each dead Palestinian infant, killed in Israel's own cruel massacre?
Israel's violence has been vastly greater at every point and in every phase of this conflict: more rapes, more murders, more torture. This is a mathematical fact. Everyone with a little honesty knows it. The only way to avoid dealing with the consequences of that recognition is to comprehensively dehumanise Palestinians and take refuge in a series of fairy stories: Israel really tried to avoid all this, they offered peace, the Arabs are savages, Israel really takes great care to avoid harming civilians, etc. Etc. And I do not take any of those seriously at all.
Israel does not have a general right to destroy, or even defeat, its enemies no matter what the impact on civilians.
Why within a week? Are you saying they should have killed about 1200 just to get it out of their system? Eye for an eye?
And if you were Hamas, what would you have done on October 8th? Since you clearly care about innocent civilians at least as much as they do. Is there anything you would have done differently to avoid such a monstrous response?
My personal preference would have been to do the ceasefire immediately; the reference to a week was loose rather than precise.
From 8 October, I doubt Hamas behaviour would have made much difference to the impact on Gaza's civilians, short of total unconditional surrender, giving themselves up. This sort of decision is not unprecedented: the Boers in the Boer war gave themselves up, partly in order to prevent, as they saw it, the physical extermination of their people as a result of the British relocation of their people and destruction of their farms. But very different political circumstances.
It's a hell of a choice to be faced with. It's not something I would call for on 8 October or now. My sense is the die is cast and having chosen their path they have to see this through. But on 8 October and today the future was/is uncertain, and hence the full meaning of that decision. Perhaps in 4 or 20 years that might end up looking like the wrong choice choice.
You're casually dismissing the idea of releasing the hostages as having any impact. That's all the Jewish world cares about, that's what their protests are about, and surely it's the only reason they've had such unprecedented backing from Biden. Jews all over the world don't wear an Israeli flag pin, but a hostages\yellow ribbon pin.
I can only assume you know it would make all the difference in the world, but it wouldn't serve the greater purpose: which is to get other countries involved and "smash the Israeli state...on our path to victory". Their words, not mine.
I'm assuming it wouldn't have had any impact simply because it was the stated position of Israel's government that it wouldn't have any impact. The release of all the hostages in exchange for the end of the war was what Hamas wanted. Israel's public position was that even if all the hostages were released it would continue the war until Hamas was destroyed or gave themselves up.
The views of the Jewish world, as such, didn't count. It was Netanyahu and his coalition that mattered. They wanted to keep hold of power. And a substantial part of the Israeli public wanted revenge/total victory more than they wanted the hostages back. This position was argued frequently: in the media, in politics, and in the public at large.
You conveniently neglected American support, which is the only game in town. Anyone who cares one iota about innocent civilians (Israelis and Palestinians), knows it’s all about the hostages. Hamas clearly cares more about themselves than “their people” (such an ugly phrase) but I can’t imagine why you would.
But there is also no evidence that the U.S. prioritised the well-being of the hostages. Biden could have ended the war and freed all the hostages in October 2023. Trump could have forced Netanyahu to stick to the ceasefire agreement he caused to be made. Neither took these opportunities. Conclusion: they obviously have other priorities.
All the hostages? You mean the ones they lost to Islamic Jihad, to civilians, the ones they murdered, or the ones badly tortured? Your Biden comment is beyond naive.
I guess I'm still not over someone who doesn't even entertain the idea of releasing hostages, for the sake of literally everyone involved. Only someone with no skin in the game can be so glib about Israeli and Palestinian lives.
My Biden comment is not naive at all. Ultimately Hamas could have recovered all or almost all of the hostages and returned them, including those held by the formal armed factions. And if there were a handful who they could not reach? Well they're scarcely relevant to your argument are they, since ex hypothesi Hamas could not have released them anyway.
I have entertained the idea that unilaterally freeing the hostages would have saved Gazan lives, I simply don't find any evidence to validate it in the behaviour of the U.S. or Israel - we are now seeing this play out again, as both parties are reportedly contemplating a return to war *instead of* freeing the hostages.
I understand you feel very sure about it, but you haven't provided any reason for anyone else to take it seriously at all.
I have more skin in the game than most. I used to live in Gaza, I have friends there still, and even other friends who got out have family members who have been killed.
Perhaps your idea just isn't as strong as you think.
Perhaps, as well, it's time for you to answer some similar questions. Has Israel acted in a way that shows maximum concern for civilian life, whether Jewish or Palestinian? What policy by Israel from 8 October would have best protected the lives of the hostages? Did they follow it? Why not? Why did the U.S. not make them?
In that case, I find it even more shocking. Are you seriously saying you need evidence as to why releasing hostages instead of torturing and starving them might be a better game plan for deescalation?
Happy to, but I'm not here defending any country, and I don't pretend to be a military strategist. If Israel stole Egyptian babies from their home, and kidnapped girls and boys from a festival etc. etc. and Egypt was destroying the country, in a war that Israel takes such horrific losses and has no way in hell of winning, the only thing I'll be doing 24/7 is shout about the release of those Egyptian hostages.
Yes, I need evidence, because of all the evidence from the course if actual events - including the express statements of the Israeli authorities - that point in exactly the opposite direction.
I agree with your assessment about the centrality of state power to the status quo, but disagree that this necessitates opponents of the status quo claiming it. Just wanted to note where I'm aligned in this debate, though I don't expect it to be resolved in a substack comment section.
Regardless, I think you & some readers might get something out of these reflections on the limits of the solidarity movement:
Hello, thanks for your comment. What's your evidence that Trump's move was a "reaction to the fact that Israel was not making progress"? If Israel wasn't making progress, why wouldn't they stop the war themselves? Why would Trump intervene on Israel's behalf, rather than his own? If attrition was the issue, where was the outcry in Israel calling for the war to end because too many soldiers were killed? Which government parties threatened to resign from Netanyahu's coalition if the war continued? Which opposition parties have seen a spike in their support due to calling for an end to the war? I just don't see evidence that the costs were thought to be unbearable.
Israel was making progress. Since the beginning of October not only did they defeat Hezbollah, they forced the flight of massive numbers of Palestinians southward from north Gaza. They were close to expelling Palestinians entirely from areas like Jabaliya camp.
I'm going to write more, soon, about the historical evidence on this question. But in brief, guerrillas need to move among a population to survive. If a counterinsurgent creates sealed areas, with no food or water, and kills anyone who moves outside, eventually the armed resistance will be unable to operate. The effectiveness of their attacks will decline, and they'll run out of ammunition and other supplies. You can see this decline in data on IDF casualties. Here are the number of lethal attacks per month in Jabalia
Oct: 6
Nov: 8
Dec: 3
Jan: 0
In the past, the IDF cleared areas and withdrew, which allowed Al-Qassam (and others) to return. But if they don't withdraw and create a perimeter, that's a very different situation. The reason counterinsurgents aren't always able to win using this technique is because they either don't have the political latitude, or the geography is unsuitable, i.e. the area is too large or inhospitable. Neither apply here.
This technique was successful on several occasions during the colonial era. If you have access to an academic library, you can read three case studies of this technique here:
Thanks again. I won't go into huge amounts of detail, because as I say I've got to write something proper:
- Lapid's view is a minority and he represents only a small party. If he represented an important one, things would be different. The ceasefire arrived due to U.S. political will, not Israeli political will. There's no evidence that they weren't willing to keep going.
- I'm familiar with Al-Qassam's use of UXO, weapons and tactics. I think Jon Elmer overstates their effectiveness. I understand why that sort of analysis appeals to people, but it's not balanced. UXO itself isn't enough. To make and distribute IED casings and Yassin 105 shells, manufacturing (including forging and machining steel) and logistics chains are necessary. Those might take time to identify and wind up, but they're not invincible. Hard to prove with certainty they're running out of ammo, but notable that they claimed their first stabbing attacks in December. And as you can see from the chart in the article, their overall lethality is falling. They're shooting fewer RPGs, detonating fewer IEDs, killing fewer IDF. Every IDF incursion into a given area (pick whichever you like) leads to successively lower IDF fatalities.
- The issue with being amongst the population is twofold. Firstly, it's a source of food and other non-military supplies. It doesn't mean they're physically fighting in a building or bloc where civilians are present, but the fighters need a communication route of some sort. Secondly, although some soldiers simply kill anyone they see, the IDF as a whole isn't ready to implement this as policy in areas where Palestinian civilians are present in large numbers. So it often allows fighters to move about above ground, e.g. between tunnel networks with a chance of not being hit by a drone.
- My belief is that the IDF is able to detect and prevent tunnels under a defined perimeter, to the extent that they can seal an area. So e.g. all Hezbollah's tunnels into/toward Israel were destroyed a few years ago, tunnels were not used on 7/10, and the Egyptians were able to stop the tunnel smuggling under the Rafah border. If I'm wrong about this then, sure, the IDF would not be able to effectively seal any area, and weapons, food, and fighters, could always reenter to continue the fight. In that case I'd need to adjust my analysis. As always, people can suppose anything. But finding evidence to make sure your analysis is rooted in reality is harder.
- I agree that Mao and Giap are invaluable sources on the theory and practice of guerrilla war, but I draw somewhat different conclusions than you. Mao, for instance, emphasised the necessity of secure bases which the opposing army could not reach, in his case defended by a conventional army. Giap echoed this. The Palestinian fedayeen met Giap personally and Chinese communist officials in the 60s and 70s, and were told, in essence, that trying to fight a guerrilla war in Palestine was probably hopeless. (They said different things in public, and I'm exaggerating a bit, but I'll write more about those meetings in due course.) The tunnels were Hamas's effort to achieve secure bases - but underground. They have undoubtedly strengthened their position relative to e.g. the PLO in Lebanon, but the bases are not as secure as they need to be to deliver the strategic foundation Giap and Mao talked about.
- I think that's not a realistic supposition about Hezbollah's position, and hard to relate to any concrete evidence. They got absolutely pasted. Their daily lethality against Israel during the ground operation was a quarter of its 2006 level, their casualties were perhaps ten times higher, and they weren't able to meaningfully retaliate for extremely hard blows like the killing of Nasrallah. The belief was always that this sort of escalation on Israel's part would trigger a massive response, but Hezbollah weren't able to deliver it. Again, a piece on this coming in future.
- Comparison of Hezbollah's lethality rate 2006 to 2024 referred only to the ground campaign phase. It would be even worse (much worse) taking the whole 13 month period, but that wouldn't be a fair comparison. I think it's clear to everyone in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, that they lost this round hard. They agreed to withdrawal north of the Litani, and to the delinking of the Gaza and Lebanon front: in other words, Israel got everything it wanted, and Hezbollah (which had said that it would maintain the unity of the fronts) backed down. Initiating an occupation wasn't a goal of the Israeli war effort.
- The (claimed) stabbing attacks I referred to were actually in Gaza (I know there were others elsewhere). The Gaza stabbings may not have taken place at all, almost certainly the IDF fatalities claimed to result did not take place. But if they did take place, it might indicate ammo issues. Regardless, it's not my main point.
- Maybe they aren't running out of ammo. But for the purposes of my argument the point is just that a unit in a sealed area would eventually run out of ammo. All we know is that their lethality is declining.
Sorry I’m shamefully behind on your writings. Thank you for including how difficult Biden made things, and opened the door for trump. Fantastic work as usual.
It's become a meme by now, but if you claim Israel's response is "overwhelming, disproportionate violence", it's only fair you offer an alternative? What would be a fitting response to a massacre so cruel where families are tortured on a Facebook livestream? When dead naked bodies of teenage girls are being lynched and spat on by civilians?
Happy to offer an alternative. Israel should have done a deal within a week for all the hostages and the end of the fighting.
Then, Israel should offer the Palestinians an actual state on the entirety of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in exchange for a total and permanent cessation of violence.
Don't tell me they wouldn't accept: if Israel hasn't offered it, that's just soeculation. Israel is the occupying power. They must get out. Every day the occupation continues is a day of Israeli war on Palestine.
Then take the troops that are now used to suppress and ethnically cleanse the West Bank, and use them to guard Israel's borders - if that policy had already been in operation on 7/10, fewer civilians would have died, perhaps none.
However cruel 7/10 was, it was orders of magnitude less cruel than what Israel has done in response, and than what Israel did in the Nakba. It was less cruel even than the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla, that Israel facilitated and oversaw. If 7/10 justified a response 50 or 100 times as violent, why do Israel's cruelties not themselves justify reprisals 50 or 100 times as violent again? How many Israelis do you think Hamas should be able to kill for each dead Palestinian infant, killed in Israel's own cruel massacre?
Israel's violence has been vastly greater at every point and in every phase of this conflict: more rapes, more murders, more torture. This is a mathematical fact. Everyone with a little honesty knows it. The only way to avoid dealing with the consequences of that recognition is to comprehensively dehumanise Palestinians and take refuge in a series of fairy stories: Israel really tried to avoid all this, they offered peace, the Arabs are savages, Israel really takes great care to avoid harming civilians, etc. Etc. And I do not take any of those seriously at all.
Israel does not have a general right to destroy, or even defeat, its enemies no matter what the impact on civilians.
Why within a week? Are you saying they should have killed about 1200 just to get it out of their system? Eye for an eye?
And if you were Hamas, what would you have done on October 8th? Since you clearly care about innocent civilians at least as much as they do. Is there anything you would have done differently to avoid such a monstrous response?
My personal preference would have been to do the ceasefire immediately; the reference to a week was loose rather than precise.
From 8 October, I doubt Hamas behaviour would have made much difference to the impact on Gaza's civilians, short of total unconditional surrender, giving themselves up. This sort of decision is not unprecedented: the Boers in the Boer war gave themselves up, partly in order to prevent, as they saw it, the physical extermination of their people as a result of the British relocation of their people and destruction of their farms. But very different political circumstances.
It's a hell of a choice to be faced with. It's not something I would call for on 8 October or now. My sense is the die is cast and having chosen their path they have to see this through. But on 8 October and today the future was/is uncertain, and hence the full meaning of that decision. Perhaps in 4 or 20 years that might end up looking like the wrong choice choice.
You're casually dismissing the idea of releasing the hostages as having any impact. That's all the Jewish world cares about, that's what their protests are about, and surely it's the only reason they've had such unprecedented backing from Biden. Jews all over the world don't wear an Israeli flag pin, but a hostages\yellow ribbon pin.
I can only assume you know it would make all the difference in the world, but it wouldn't serve the greater purpose: which is to get other countries involved and "smash the Israeli state...on our path to victory". Their words, not mine.
I'm assuming it wouldn't have had any impact simply because it was the stated position of Israel's government that it wouldn't have any impact. The release of all the hostages in exchange for the end of the war was what Hamas wanted. Israel's public position was that even if all the hostages were released it would continue the war until Hamas was destroyed or gave themselves up.
The views of the Jewish world, as such, didn't count. It was Netanyahu and his coalition that mattered. They wanted to keep hold of power. And a substantial part of the Israeli public wanted revenge/total victory more than they wanted the hostages back. This position was argued frequently: in the media, in politics, and in the public at large.
You conveniently neglected American support, which is the only game in town. Anyone who cares one iota about innocent civilians (Israelis and Palestinians), knows it’s all about the hostages. Hamas clearly cares more about themselves than “their people” (such an ugly phrase) but I can’t imagine why you would.
But there is also no evidence that the U.S. prioritised the well-being of the hostages. Biden could have ended the war and freed all the hostages in October 2023. Trump could have forced Netanyahu to stick to the ceasefire agreement he caused to be made. Neither took these opportunities. Conclusion: they obviously have other priorities.
Our govt does not, and did not care about the hostages. There were Americans there killed by the iof as well, and there was no comment.
All the hostages? You mean the ones they lost to Islamic Jihad, to civilians, the ones they murdered, or the ones badly tortured? Your Biden comment is beyond naive.
I guess I'm still not over someone who doesn't even entertain the idea of releasing hostages, for the sake of literally everyone involved. Only someone with no skin in the game can be so glib about Israeli and Palestinian lives.
My Biden comment is not naive at all. Ultimately Hamas could have recovered all or almost all of the hostages and returned them, including those held by the formal armed factions. And if there were a handful who they could not reach? Well they're scarcely relevant to your argument are they, since ex hypothesi Hamas could not have released them anyway.
I have entertained the idea that unilaterally freeing the hostages would have saved Gazan lives, I simply don't find any evidence to validate it in the behaviour of the U.S. or Israel - we are now seeing this play out again, as both parties are reportedly contemplating a return to war *instead of* freeing the hostages.
I understand you feel very sure about it, but you haven't provided any reason for anyone else to take it seriously at all.
I have more skin in the game than most. I used to live in Gaza, I have friends there still, and even other friends who got out have family members who have been killed.
Perhaps your idea just isn't as strong as you think.
Perhaps, as well, it's time for you to answer some similar questions. Has Israel acted in a way that shows maximum concern for civilian life, whether Jewish or Palestinian? What policy by Israel from 8 October would have best protected the lives of the hostages? Did they follow it? Why not? Why did the U.S. not make them?
In that case, I find it even more shocking. Are you seriously saying you need evidence as to why releasing hostages instead of torturing and starving them might be a better game plan for deescalation?
Happy to, but I'm not here defending any country, and I don't pretend to be a military strategist. If Israel stole Egyptian babies from their home, and kidnapped girls and boys from a festival etc. etc. and Egypt was destroying the country, in a war that Israel takes such horrific losses and has no way in hell of winning, the only thing I'll be doing 24/7 is shout about the release of those Egyptian hostages.
Yes, I need evidence, because of all the evidence from the course if actual events - including the express statements of the Israeli authorities - that point in exactly the opposite direction.
I agree with your assessment about the centrality of state power to the status quo, but disagree that this necessitates opponents of the status quo claiming it. Just wanted to note where I'm aligned in this debate, though I don't expect it to be resolved in a substack comment section.
Regardless, I think you & some readers might get something out of these reflections on the limits of the solidarity movement:
https://types.mataroa.blog/blog/solifails/
It’s quite simple really, here’s the formula
HATRED + PREJUDICE + FEAR = CONFLICT × DIVISION
Yet...
(COURAGE + TRUTH + EMPATHY) × RESILIENCE = RECONCILIATION × UNITY
Therefore...
(RECONCILIATION + JUSTICE + FORGIVENESS) × TIME = LASTING_PEACE × RENEWED_HUMANITY
Hello, thanks for your comment. What's your evidence that Trump's move was a "reaction to the fact that Israel was not making progress"? If Israel wasn't making progress, why wouldn't they stop the war themselves? Why would Trump intervene on Israel's behalf, rather than his own? If attrition was the issue, where was the outcry in Israel calling for the war to end because too many soldiers were killed? Which government parties threatened to resign from Netanyahu's coalition if the war continued? Which opposition parties have seen a spike in their support due to calling for an end to the war? I just don't see evidence that the costs were thought to be unbearable.
Israel was making progress. Since the beginning of October not only did they defeat Hezbollah, they forced the flight of massive numbers of Palestinians southward from north Gaza. They were close to expelling Palestinians entirely from areas like Jabaliya camp.
I'm going to write more, soon, about the historical evidence on this question. But in brief, guerrillas need to move among a population to survive. If a counterinsurgent creates sealed areas, with no food or water, and kills anyone who moves outside, eventually the armed resistance will be unable to operate. The effectiveness of their attacks will decline, and they'll run out of ammunition and other supplies. You can see this decline in data on IDF casualties. Here are the number of lethal attacks per month in Jabalia
Oct: 6
Nov: 8
Dec: 3
Jan: 0
In the past, the IDF cleared areas and withdrew, which allowed Al-Qassam (and others) to return. But if they don't withdraw and create a perimeter, that's a very different situation. The reason counterinsurgents aren't always able to win using this technique is because they either don't have the political latitude, or the geography is unsuitable, i.e. the area is too large or inhospitable. Neither apply here.
This technique was successful on several occasions during the colonial era. If you have access to an academic library, you can read three case studies of this technique here:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698240701699631 - if you don't have that sort of access, and you'd like to read it, drop me a message, I can pass on a PDF.
Thanks again. I won't go into huge amounts of detail, because as I say I've got to write something proper:
- Lapid's view is a minority and he represents only a small party. If he represented an important one, things would be different. The ceasefire arrived due to U.S. political will, not Israeli political will. There's no evidence that they weren't willing to keep going.
- I'm familiar with Al-Qassam's use of UXO, weapons and tactics. I think Jon Elmer overstates their effectiveness. I understand why that sort of analysis appeals to people, but it's not balanced. UXO itself isn't enough. To make and distribute IED casings and Yassin 105 shells, manufacturing (including forging and machining steel) and logistics chains are necessary. Those might take time to identify and wind up, but they're not invincible. Hard to prove with certainty they're running out of ammo, but notable that they claimed their first stabbing attacks in December. And as you can see from the chart in the article, their overall lethality is falling. They're shooting fewer RPGs, detonating fewer IEDs, killing fewer IDF. Every IDF incursion into a given area (pick whichever you like) leads to successively lower IDF fatalities.
- The issue with being amongst the population is twofold. Firstly, it's a source of food and other non-military supplies. It doesn't mean they're physically fighting in a building or bloc where civilians are present, but the fighters need a communication route of some sort. Secondly, although some soldiers simply kill anyone they see, the IDF as a whole isn't ready to implement this as policy in areas where Palestinian civilians are present in large numbers. So it often allows fighters to move about above ground, e.g. between tunnel networks with a chance of not being hit by a drone.
- My belief is that the IDF is able to detect and prevent tunnels under a defined perimeter, to the extent that they can seal an area. So e.g. all Hezbollah's tunnels into/toward Israel were destroyed a few years ago, tunnels were not used on 7/10, and the Egyptians were able to stop the tunnel smuggling under the Rafah border. If I'm wrong about this then, sure, the IDF would not be able to effectively seal any area, and weapons, food, and fighters, could always reenter to continue the fight. In that case I'd need to adjust my analysis. As always, people can suppose anything. But finding evidence to make sure your analysis is rooted in reality is harder.
- I agree that Mao and Giap are invaluable sources on the theory and practice of guerrilla war, but I draw somewhat different conclusions than you. Mao, for instance, emphasised the necessity of secure bases which the opposing army could not reach, in his case defended by a conventional army. Giap echoed this. The Palestinian fedayeen met Giap personally and Chinese communist officials in the 60s and 70s, and were told, in essence, that trying to fight a guerrilla war in Palestine was probably hopeless. (They said different things in public, and I'm exaggerating a bit, but I'll write more about those meetings in due course.) The tunnels were Hamas's effort to achieve secure bases - but underground. They have undoubtedly strengthened their position relative to e.g. the PLO in Lebanon, but the bases are not as secure as they need to be to deliver the strategic foundation Giap and Mao talked about.
- I think that's not a realistic supposition about Hezbollah's position, and hard to relate to any concrete evidence. They got absolutely pasted. Their daily lethality against Israel during the ground operation was a quarter of its 2006 level, their casualties were perhaps ten times higher, and they weren't able to meaningfully retaliate for extremely hard blows like the killing of Nasrallah. The belief was always that this sort of escalation on Israel's part would trigger a massive response, but Hezbollah weren't able to deliver it. Again, a piece on this coming in future.
Very quickly:
- Comparison of Hezbollah's lethality rate 2006 to 2024 referred only to the ground campaign phase. It would be even worse (much worse) taking the whole 13 month period, but that wouldn't be a fair comparison. I think it's clear to everyone in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, that they lost this round hard. They agreed to withdrawal north of the Litani, and to the delinking of the Gaza and Lebanon front: in other words, Israel got everything it wanted, and Hezbollah (which had said that it would maintain the unity of the fronts) backed down. Initiating an occupation wasn't a goal of the Israeli war effort.
- The (claimed) stabbing attacks I referred to were actually in Gaza (I know there were others elsewhere). The Gaza stabbings may not have taken place at all, almost certainly the IDF fatalities claimed to result did not take place. But if they did take place, it might indicate ammo issues. Regardless, it's not my main point.
- Maybe they aren't running out of ammo. But for the purposes of my argument the point is just that a unit in a sealed area would eventually run out of ammo. All we know is that their lethality is declining.